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OHIO'S NEW PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is properly the responsibility of the judges . ..to promote the un-

folding of the central idea underlying the concept of strict liability, and
to see that the adjustment of the conflicting interests of the several types
of persons affected is fair and responsible. .

.

.When tort law develops

to a point that one group of persons conceives it to be too favorable to
another group

. . .

the first group is likely to seek legislative "redress."'

All across the nation, these words are becoming a reality. Fueled
by skyrocketing products liability insurance rates2 and the growing perception that "strict" products liability is becoming "absolute" products
liability,' insurance companies and manufacturing firms have joined together to lobby for legislative reform in the area of products liability.
In Ohio, this movement resulted in the recent enactment of a comprehensive products liability statute.4 The following note will consider a
general history of the doctrine of strict products liability and some of
the recent judicial developments that have led to the movement for legislative reform. Then, it will analyze Ohio's new products liability statute. 5 This analysis will focus on the three most controversial provisions
of the Ohio act: (1) the legislature's decision to adopt a bifurcated approach for determining whether a product is defective by design;' (2)
the statute's rejection of the hindsight standard for considering defectiveness; 7 and (3) the legislature's refusal to allow comparative respon8
sibility to be asserted as a defense in a strict products liability action.

1. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551,
575 (1980).
2. See Brody, When Products Turn into Liabilities, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 1986, at 20, 24 (observing that "[as] insurers have raised rates for liability coverage, or pulled out of the market
altogether, unease among American manufacturers has given way to near-panic"); Sorry, Your
Policy Is Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 18 (stating that "[t]he $9.1 billion Americans paid
• . . [in 1985 for] liability insurance premiums was almost 60% higher than the figure . . . in
1983 and roughly equal to the combined 1985 budgets of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and the Central Intelligence Agency"); N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1986, at 35, col. 3.
3. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY,
FINAL REPORT 1-26 (1977) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (noting that a few courts have come
"very close to holding the tort-litigation system should provide a recovery for persons who merely
proved that they were injured by a product [and that] while these cases appear to be relatively
few in number insurers have regarded them as quite important in their pricing practices").
4. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.71-2307.80 (Anderson Supp. 1988).
5. Id.
6. Id. § 2307.75.
7. Id.
8. Id. § 2315.20(c)(1).
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BACKGROUND

Over the last thirty years the development of strict products liability has progressed in three stages: adoption, clarification, and reformation. The following background section will discuss each of these stages
separately, focusing initially on nationwide developments and then on
the manifestation of such developments in Ohio's products liability law.
A.

Adoption

From a national perspective the adoption stage began in the early
1960s with the celebrated case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.9 In Greenman, Justice Traynor enunciated the following standard
for products liability in tort:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market . . . proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. . . . To establish the manufacturer's liability it is sufficient that

plaintiff prove[] that he was injured while using the [product] in a way
that it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in design and
manufacture .

.

. .10

Two years after the Greenman decision, the American Law Institute
adopted and published its own standard for products liability in Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts." The combination of
these two authorities laid the groundwork for what was to become one
of the most revolutionary changes in American tort law. Henceforth, in
products liability actions in tort, the focus of the inquiry would be
placed on the condition of the product, rather than on the fault of the
manufacturer.
Courts 2 and commentators" alike voiced their support for the

9. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
10. Id. at 62-64, 377 P.2d at 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965). This section states:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of
selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
12. See, e.g., Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply Corp., 374 Mich. 194, 203, 132 N.W.2d 54, 57
(1965) ("We are holding that in a suit upon a warranty theory it is not necessary to show negligence, but rather breach of an implied warranty"); Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn.
505, -,
127 N.W.2d 557, 560 (1964) (noting that in products liability cases "[tihe trend has
been increasingly to apply a strict liability to the . [seller]"); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument
Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83 (1963) (favorably citing the Greenman decision in
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/14
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move away from negligence and towards strict products liability.
Within a relatively short period of time, this doctrine was adopted in a
vast majority of jurisdictions across the United States.' Basically,
three major policy arguments were offered in support of the adoption of
strict products liability. First, proponents of the products liability theory argued that, given the complexity of modern day manufacturing
processes, it would be extremely difficult for a plaintiff to establish the

manufacturer's liability under a negligence theory.' 5 Second, advocates

of strict products liability contended that the manufacturer is usually in
a better position than the consumer to absorb or spread the costs of
injuries caused by the manufacturer's products.' Third, supporters of
strict liability maintained that it would deter manufacturers from producing unsafe products because it would make liability for defective
17
products more certain.
In Ohio, the adoption stage of strict products liability began with
the case of Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.' 8 In Rogers, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that a claimant injured by a defective product
could maintain an action against a manufacturer based upon a tort theory of express warranty, despite the fact that there was no privity between the manufacturer and the claimant. 9
Later, in 1966, the Ohio Supreme Court expanded upon the Rog-

support of adoption of strict products liability).
13. See, e.g., Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of
a Defect, 41 TEX. L. REV. 855, 856 (1963) (listing numerous factors which have contributed to the
view that "when the benefits to the many come at a high cost to the few, the many should pay for
these losses"); Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road to and Past
Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 30, 59 (1965) ("In enunciating the concept of strict liability, the
courts have served at least two venerable . . . ends . . . stripp[ing] away the vestigial remnants
which rendered the warranty action so cumbersome and restor[ing] simplicity and attention to
substance . . . in the field of products liability"); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) (providing the seminal discussion on the fall of
the "citadel" of privity).
14. For a recent comprehensive survey of each state's position on strict products liability,
see Bieman, Strict Products Liability: An Overview of State Law, 10 J. PROD. LIAB. 111 (1987).
15. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 693 (5th ed. 1984).
16. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 402(A) comment c.
17. W KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, at 693.
18. 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
19. Id. at 249, 147 N.E.2d at 615-16. The court observed:
Surely under modern merchandising practices the manufacturer owes a very real obligation
toward those who consume or use his products. The warranties made by the manufacturer
in his advertisements and by the labels on his products are inducements to the ultimate
consumers, and the manufacturer ought to be held to strict accountability to any consumer
who buys the product in reliance on such representations and later suffers injury because
the product proves to be defective or deleterious.
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ers rationale in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp.2 0 The Lonzrick decision provided for recovery in a tort action based upon a theory of implied warranty.2 The court reasoned that if one products liability
claimant saw a manufacturer's advertisement and another claimant did
not, but both were injured by the same product, it would be inherently
unfair to allow recovery to the first claimant while denying recovery to
the second.22 Thus, under Lonzrick, a claimant who was injured by a
manufacturer's defective product could maintain an action in tort despite the fact that he had not relied upon any express representations of
the manufacturer.23 This "implied warranty in tort" theory informally
established a strict products liability standard in Ohio. Finally in 1977,
the Ohio Supreme Court formally established a strict products liability
standard by adopting Section 402A of the Restatement in Temple v.
Wean United, Inc.2 4 In Temple the court stated:
Because there are virtually no distinctions between Ohio's implied warranty in tort theory and the Restatement version of strict liability in tort,
and because the Restatement formulation, together with its numerous
illustrative comments, greatly facilitates analysis in this area, we hereby
approve Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d. 25
B.

Clarification

Along with the virtually nationwide adoption of strict products liability came the need for a clarification of what the elements of the
doctrine were and how it would interact with other substantive areas of
tort law. Nowhere was the need for clarification of elements more evident than in the area of design defects. Neither the Greenman decision
nor Section 402A distinguished between the standard for a design defect and the standard for a manufacturing defect.2 6 Yet, there is a significant difference between the two. In the case of a manufacturing
defect, an objective standard for defectiveness is readily ascertainable.
If a particular product is manufactured in such a way that it does not
measure up to the manufacturer's own intended specifications, then
that product contains a manufacturing defect.2 7 There is no such objec-

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
Id. at 237, 218 N.E.2d at 192.
Id.
Id.
50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
Id. at 322, 364 N.E.2d at 271.
See A. MURPHY, K. SATAGATA & F. GRAD, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 22-25 (1982).
27. M. MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 322 (1988); P. SHERMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR
THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER 149 (1981); Wade, supra note 1, at 551 ("As a term of art, 'Defechttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/14
tive' gives little trouble when something goes wrong in the manufacturing process and the product
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tive standard for determining whether a product contains a design de-

fect. Moreover, from the manufacturer's point of view, there is an even
more significant difference between these two types of defects: While a

manufacturing defect indicates that one unit of a product is defective, a
design defect indicates that an entire product line is defective.18 Thus,

it was of the utmost importance that courts develop a clear and uniform standard for determining whether a product was defective in
design.
Unfortunately, clarity and uniformity proved to be elusive goals in
the area of design defects. Ultimately three different tests were developed to establish whether a product was defectively designed. As a result of its endorsement in Section 402A of the Restatement, the consumer expectation test was the first test to be applied in the area of
design defects. 9 Reflecting the warranty heritage of strict products liability,30 the consumer expectation test defines a product as defective
when it is dangerous beyond the extent reasonably contemplated by the
ordinary consumer.3 1 A number of courts 2 and commentators3 3 have

maintained that this test is the most appropriate formulation for determining whether a product has a design defect. In the early 1970s,

though, this assertion was challenged by Professors Wade
ton. 33

4

and Kee-

Wade and Keeton argued that the test for design defects should

is not in its intended condition").
28. See A. MURPHY, K. SATAGATA & F. GRAD, supra note 26, at 149.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 402(A) provides the following definition of an unreasonably dangerous product:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the defective condition of the product
makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer . . . . The article sold must be
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics.
30. See Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339, 348
(1974).
31. See, e.g., Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 IlI. 2d 339, 342-43, 247
N.E.2d 401, 403 (1969); Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 230 Kan. 643, -,
641 P.2d 353, 359
(1982); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, -, 435 P.2d 806, 808 (1967); Young v. Tide
Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 471, 242 S.E.2d 671, 679-80 (1978); G.M. v. Simmons, 545 S.W.2d
855 (Tex. 1976), rev'd, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum
Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 332, 230 N.W.2d 794, 798-99 (1975).
32. E.g., Dunham, 42 Ill. 2d at 342-43, 247 N.E.2d at 403; Lester, 230 Kan. at -, 641
P.2d at 359; Vincer, 69 Wis. 2d at 332, 230 N.W.2d at 798-99.
33. See, e.g., Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42
IND. L.J. 301, 331 (1967); Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative Model for
Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MERCER L. REV. 465, 467-84 (1978); Rheingold, What are the Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations"?, 22 Bus. LAw. 589, 591-600
(1967).
34. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability, 44 MiSS. L.J. 825 (1973).
Published
eCommons,
35. byKeeton,
Products1988
Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973).
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36
be drawn from the law of torts, rather than the law of contracts. They
suggested that some form of a risk/utility analysis should replace the
consumer expectation test. Professor Wade set forth a multi-factor
analysis for judges and juries to consider in determining whether a
product was defective by design.3a Professor Keeton, on the other hand,
proposed that the analysis should turn on whether a reasonable manufacturer would place this product on the market, assuming that the
manufacturer knew of the risks and utilities presently involved in the
product's use.38

A number of courts have adopted a risk/utility standard for determining whether a product is defectively designed.39 However, other
courts have refused to adopt such a standard, maintaining that a risk/
utility test constitutes a return to negligence. 0 Such criticisms may or
may not be well founded, depending upon the form of risk/utility analysis employed. Although the Keeton formulation might superficially resemble a negligence standard, closer scrutiny reveals that there are distinct differences between the two. Foremost among these differences is
the fact that Professor Keeton's risk/utility test focuses primarily upon

the nature of the product: If the risks of the product outweigh its utilities at the time of trial, then the product is defective in design."' Unlike negligence-which focuses on the manufacturer's conduct at the

36. ' Wade, supra note 1, at 556.
37. Wade, supra note 34, at 837-38. Wade lists the factors as follows:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the public as a whole;
(2) The safety aspect-the likelihood that the product will cause injury, and the probable
seriousness of the injury;
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need but less
safely;
(4) The manufacturer's ability to make the product safer without impairing its usefulness
or making it too expensive to maintain its utility;
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product;
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of the obviousness of the danger, or the existence of suitable warnings
or instructions;
(7) The manufacturer's ability to spread the loss by setting the price of the product or
carrying liability insurance.
Id.
38. See Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tax. L. REV. 398,
403-04 (1970).
39. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 175-76, 386 A.2d 816,
827-28 (1978); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 108-09, 450 N.E.2d 204, 208-09,
463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 402-03 (1983); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 498-99, 525
P.2d 1033, 1038-39 (1974).
40. See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry Co., 81 N.J. 150, 171, 406 A.2d 140, 150 (1979);
Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 555-59, 391 A.2d 1020, 1024-26 (1978).
41. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Markethttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/14
ing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 761-63 (1983).
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time the product was designed-Professor Keeton's test uses a hindsight approach that focuses on the nature of the product at the time of
trial.42 Hence, Keeton's theory is consistent with "strict" products
liability.
However, the same cannot be said for Professor Wade's risk/utility standard. In a recent article,"' Professor Wade acknowledges that
his design defect formulation differs from Professor Keeton's in one vital respect: Professor Wade's test views the risks and utilities of the
product at the time it was distributed, rather than at the time of trial.""
In support of his position, Professor Wade points out that a risk/utility
hindsight approach can place an unfair burden on the manufacturer
because it holds the manufacturer responsible for risks which were scientifically unknowable, misuses which were absolutely unforeseeable,
and designs which were technologically infeasible at the time of distribution. 45 Despite the inherent fairness of Professor Wade's approach, it
may be viewed as inconsistent with the tenets of strict products liability. It can be argued that Professor Wade's standard shifts the focus of
the strict products liability analysis towards what the manufacturer
could have known or done at the time of distribution and away from
the product's actual condition at the time of trial. Thus, Wade's approach may-as its critics claim-constitute a return to negligence in
the realm of design defects.
A third standard for determining whether a design defect exists
combines both the consumer expectation test and the risk/utility test.
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. 46 is the leading case which advocates
this bifurcated approach. In Barker the California Supreme Court held
that a design defect exists:
(1) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended
or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the plaintiff proves that the
product's design proximately caused hisinjury and the defendant fails to
prove, in light of the relevant factors . . . that on balance the benefits of
the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such
47
design.
The two-pronged standard set forth in Barker is an extremely proplaintiff approach for two reasons. First, it gives the plaintiff two alter42. Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CUMB. L.
REv. 293, 305-08 (1979).
43. Wade, supra note 41, at 761-63.
44. id.
45. Id. at 760.
46. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
Published
1988at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
47. byId.eCommons,
at 435, 573 P.2d
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native routes through which to establish the manufacturer's liability in
a design defect suit. Second, under the risk/utility prong of the test,
the burden of proof is shifted onto the manufacturer to show that the
utilities of the product outweigh its risks. A few courts have adopted
the Barker approach, 8 but other courts 9 and commentators50 have rejected it claiming that the two-pronged standard is confusing and onesided.
During the second stage of the development of strict products lia-

bility there was also a need for some clarification on how this doctrine
would interact with other substantive areas of tort law. Nationally, the
most controversial issue in this respect was whether the affirmative defense of comparative negligence could be asserted in a strict products
liability action. The theory of comparative negligence was developed in
response to the harshness of its predecessor--contributory negligence."'
Under traditional contributory negligence, a plaintiff who was even

slightly at fault in causing his own injury was completely barred from
recovery. Under the comparative negligence theory; however, the cost
of an accident is to be apportioned between the plaintiff and the defendant in relation to their respective degrees of responsibility. 2
There are essentially four different types of comparative negligence systems operating in the United States today: (1) the pure comparative negligence system;5" (2) the less than system of comparative
negligence; 54 (3) the greater than system of comparative negligence; 55
and (4) the slight versus gross system of comparative negligence.56

48. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 884-87 (Alaska 1979); Knitz
v. Minster Mach. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 463, 432 N.E.2d 814, 818, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857
(1982).
49. See Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods Co., 176 Mont. 123, 130-31, 576 P.2d 725, 729-30
(1978); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 498-99, 525 P.2d 1033, 1038-39 (1974).
50. See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty]
to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 602-10 (1980); Henderson, Renewed
Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging
Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773, 782-97 (1979).
51. Fischer, Products Liability-Applicabilityof Comparative Negligence, 43 Mo. L. REV.
431, 432 (1978).
52. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 29 (2d ed. 1986).
53. See Fischer, supra note 51, at 436. In a pure comparative negligence system, liability is
apportioned in direct proportion to fault in all cases. Therefore, even where a plaintiff is 90 percent responsible for his accident, he can still recover the 10 percent of his damages attributable to
the defendant's own conduct. Id.
54. Id. at 437. Under the less than system of comparative negligence, a plaintiff can only
recover where his fault is less than that of the defendant. Thus, if the plaintiff's fault exceeds 49
percent, he is completely barred from recovery. Id.
55. Id. In a greater than system of comparative negligence, a plaintiff can recover so long as
his degree of fault is not greater than that of the defendant. Here, the plaintiff who is 50 percent
responsible for his accident can still recover the other half of his damages from the defendant. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/14
56. Id. Under the slight versus gross system of comparative negligence, the plaintiff is only
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Each of these systems demonstrates the significant role that a plaintiff's
conduct can play in the reduction of an award for damages. Basically,
there are two policy arguments underlying all of these systems. First, a
plaintiff who bears partial responsibility for an accident should not be
able to recover full damages from a defendant who is not entirely at
fault in causing the accident. 57 Second, a plaintiff should be encouraged to maintain a reasonable standard of care for his own personal welfare and safety.58 It is the first of these policy goals which
raises the question of whether comparative negligence should be a defense in a strict products liability action. The first policy goal focuses
on comparing the plaintiff's fault with that of the defendant. In a truly
"strict" products liability action, though, it would seem that the defendant's fault is not an issue in the case. If the product is defective,
the manufacturer is liable regardless of the degree of care exercised.
Despite this semantic inconsistency, a majority of jurisdictions have
chosen to adopt comparative negligence as a defense to strict products
liability. 5 9 Courts and commentators have offered a number of rationales for reconciling the two doctrines. One of the first cases to apply
comparative negligence as a defense in a strict products liability action
was Dippel v. Sciano.60 In Dippel, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
skirted the semantic inconsistency between strict products liability and
comparative negligence by characterizing strict products liability as
negligence per se.61 Although the "negligence" aspect of negligence per
se allows for semantic continuity between the two doctrines, critics of
the Dippel rationale claim that the negligence per se analogy is inappropriate in the area of strict products liability.6 2
Other authorities have attempted to resolve the conceptual differences between strict products liability and comparative negligence by
maintaining that fault does exist in a strict products liability action.6 3
According to these authorities, fault-in the strict liability sense-can
be characterized as either "the 'social fault' involved in marketing de-

allowed to recover damages when his fault is slight in comparison with that of the defendant. No
apportionment of damages is made in this system of comparative negligence. Id.
57. See Status and Trends in State Product Liability Law: Theories of Recovery, 14 J. OF
LEGIS. 216, 226 (1987).
58. See Fischer, supra note 51, at 432.
59. For a complete listing of the jurisdictions which have adopted comparative negligence as
a defense to strict products liability, see Bieman, supra note 14, at I11.
60. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
61. Id. at -,
155 N.W.2d at 64.
62. See, e.g., Carestia, The Interactionof Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability-Where are We?, 30 INS. CouNs. J. 53, 61-63 (1980).
63. See Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho
1976); Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIR L. & COM. 107
Published
by eCommons, 1988
(1976).
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fective products or the 'legal fault' arising from . . .[the breach of a]
• . .duty to market defect free products."6' 4 It is this "social" or "legal" fault which can then be compared with the plaintiff's fault for
purposes of apportioning damages. Another approach for bringing the
6
two doctrines into accord is comparative causation. Under this approach, the focus of the inquiry is not upon the fault of the parties
involved in the accident; but rather, it is upon the causal contribution
of each party to the accident. Here, in apportioning damages, the court
considers the extent to which the defendant's product and the plaintiff's
own conduct caused the injury. A final method for harmonizing strict
products liability and comparative negligence is to compare the plaintiff's conduct with that of a reasonable person placed in the same or
similar circumstances. 66 Under this approach, there is no need to look
to the defendant's fault or the product's causal contribution to the accident. Instead, the plaintiffs recovery will simply be reduced by the extent to which his conduct during the accident deviated from that of a
reasonable person.
But regardless of the theoretical approach that is taken, it is important to note that an unspoken policy rationale may lie behind this
nationwide judicial movement in the area of comparative negligence.
As the clarification stage began to draw to a close, some commentators
that the doctrine of strict products liability had become too
maintained
"strict. '67 Injecting comparative negligence principles into strict products liability may be viewed as a way of returning balance to the system because it relieves the manufacturer from paying for that part of
the accident which is attributable to the plaintiffs own conduct. Hence,
the inherent fairness of the doctrine of comparative negligence in the
strict products liability realm may have played a key role in its adoption by many states.
In Ohio, the various facets of the clarification stage were essentially manifested in two cases-Knitz v. Minster Machine Co.68 and
Bowling v. Heil Co."9 The Knitz case answered the question of how

64.

Fischer supra note 51, at 435.

See Brewster, supra note 63, at 118.
66. See Payne, Reduction of Damages for Contributory Negligence, 18 MOD. L. REV. 344,
344-47 (1955).
67. See, e.g., Symposium, Products Liability: Toward Balancing the Scales. 11 AKRON L.
REV. 593 (1978).
65.

68. 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814, cert.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/14
69.

denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982).

31 Ohio St. 3d 277, 511 N.E.2d 373 (1987).
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design defects would be evaluated under Ohio law. 70 First, in Knitz the
Ohio Supreme Court held:
[A] product design is in a defective condition to the user or consumer if
(1) it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risk inherent in such
71
design.
Basically, this standard adopts the bifurcated approach advocated by
the California Supreme Court in Barker. However, the Ohio Supreme
Court was unwilling to go so far as to shift the burden of proof on the
issue of defectiveness from the plaintiff to the defendant.7 1 Second, the
Knitz court also stated that "a product may be found defective in design, even if it satisfies ordinary consumer expectations, if through
hindsight the jury determines that the product's design embodies 'excessive preventable danger-. . . .'
Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court
adopted a hindsight approach for evaluating design defects, much like
the one advocated by Professor Keeton. 4 Under such a hindsight standard, the risk/utility prong of the Knitz test focuses on the risks and
utilities of the product in question at the time of trial, rather than at
the time of manufacture.
The Bowling decision supplied an answer to the question of
whether the doctrine of comparative responsibility would be applicable
to strict products liability actions under Ohio law. In Bowling, the Ohio
Supreme Court expressed concern over the theoretical inconsistencies
between the doctrines of strict products liability and comparative responsibility. In particular, the court focused on the incompatibility
between enterprise liability and apportioning damage. Enterprise liability calls for spreading the loss caused by the defective product among
all the users of the product whereas apportioning damages calls for dividing damage awards between the manufacturer and the plaintiff
based upon the responsibility of each for the plaintiff's injury.76 Based
on these concerns, the Ohio Supreme Court ultimately concluded that
the "principles of comparative negligence or comparative fault have no
application to a products liability case based upon strict liability in
tort." 7
",

70. Knitz, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 465, 432 N.E.2d at 817.
71. Id. at 466, 432 N.E.2d at 818.
72. Id. at 464-65, 432 N.E.2d at 817.
73. Id.
74. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
75. Bowling, 31 Ohio St. 3d at 285-86, 511 N.E.2d at 381.
76. Id.
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C. Reformation
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a growing perception across the nation that the products liability revolution had
turned into a products liability "crisis."78 One of the major factors contributing to this concern was the dramatic increase in the cost of obtaining products liability insurance. 79 The insurance industry blamed
the rate increases on the recent influx of strict products liability suits at
both the state and federal level.8" The American Trial Lawyers Association, however, argued that the rate increases were primarily a result of
mismanagement and poor financial planning on the part of the insurance industry. 8 1 Regardless of who or what was to blame for the problem, the simple fact remained that a problem did exist. A number of
manufacturing firms, especially smaller ones, were faced with three undesirable alternatives during the late 1970s and early 1980s: (1) they
could try to absorb the substantial insurance premium increases into
the costs of their products; (2) they could drop their insurance coverage
and continue to operate without insurance; or (3) they could look for a
new type of product to manufacture. 82 The first alternative was viewed
as undesirable because it was economically infeasible for many industries.8 3 The second alternative was also undesirable since it would often
leave injured plaintiffs with no way to enforce their products liability
judgments against manufacturers. 84 Finally, the third alternative was
undesirable as well, because it might lead to a mass exodus of manufacturers away from the production of high-risk products which are extremely useful to our society. 85
In response to this problem, a number of state legislatures enacted
statutes designed to make products liability insurance more available
and more affordable. Various statutory means were employed in the
attempt to achieve this goal. Some of the most significant legislative
developments were statutes of repose and limitation on products liability claims; statutes providing for the application of comparative negligence principles to strict products liability; and statutes shielding man-

78. W. PROSSER, J. WADE, V. SCHWARTZ, TORTS CASES AND MATERIALS 737 (7th ed.
1982).
79. See Brody, supra note 2, at 20.
80. Id.
81. See Rutigliano, Insurance Crisesfor Doctors? Fact, Fantasy, or Fiction?, TRIAL, May
1986, at 28; Stewart, The "Tort Reform" Hoax, TRIAL. July 1986, at 89.
82. Cf Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability Act-A Brief Overview, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 579, 579 (1980); Note, The Proposed Product Liability Statute in Ohio-Its Purpose and
Probable Results, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 141, 143 (1980).
83. See Note, supra note 82, at 143.
84. See Schwartz, supra note 82, at 579.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/14
85. Id.
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ufacturers from hindsight liability for risks which were scientifically
technologically infeasible at the
unknowable or designs which were
86
time of the product's manufacture.
Significant developments also occurred at the federal level during
the latter part of the 1970s. In November of 1977, the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability issued an extensive report on
the causes of the products liability crisis.87 The report was highly critical of the insurance industry's ratemaking procedures. 88 It also concluded that one of the primary problems underlying the crisis was the
level of uncertainty and imbalance present in the tort litigation system. 89 Based upon the conclusions of this report, the Department of
Commerce drafted the Uniform Products Liability Act (U.P.L.A.)9 °
for voluntary use by the states in reforming their strict products liability standards. The U.P.L.A. suggests that a number of important
changes need to be made in the area of products liability law. Initially,
it is important to note that although the U.P.L.A. retains a strict liability standard for manufacturing defects, it adopts a fault based approach for determining whether a design defect exists.9 The U.P.L.A.
states:
In order to determine that the product was unreasonably unsafe in design, the trier of fact must find that, at the time of manufacture, the
likelihood that the product would cause the claimant's harm or similar
harms, and the seriousness of these harms outweighed the burden on the
manufacturer to design a product that would have prevented those
harms, and the adverse affect that alternative design would have on the
usefulness of the product. 2
This standard-much like the Keeton and Wade standards discussed
earlier 9a-employs a risk utility analysis to determine whether the
product is defective by design. Moreover, like the Wade standard, the
U.P.L.A. does not base the time for ascertaining the risks and the utilities of the product at the time of trial. Rather, the U.P.L.A. indicates
that the risks of the product must outweigh its utilities at the time the
product was manufactured.

86.

For a summary of recent products liability reform statutes, see L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDLIABILITY § 16C(l)(i) (1987).
87. FINAL REPORT, supra note 3.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT, reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. 62, 714 (1979) [hereinafter U.P.L.A.].
91. Id. § 104(B), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
92. Id.
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The U.P.L.A. also suggests a structured approach for considering
the role that a plaintiff's misconduct should play in the reduction of
damage awards. 94 The act discusses four different types of conduct
which will trigger comparative responsibility.9 5 First, although a plaintiff is not required to inspect a product, his damages may be reduced if
he is injured while using a product whose defect is readily apparent
even without inspection.96 Second, where a plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably uses a product which he knows to be defective, his damages
will be subject to reduction.97 Third, if a plaintiff misuses a product his
"damages shall be subject to reduction or apportionment to the extent
that the misuse was a cause of the harm."9 Fourth, a plaintiff's alteration or modification of a product will result in a reduction of the damage award, except where such alteration or modification was reasonably
foreseeable by the manufacturer.9 9
Commentators have expressed mixed opinions on the U.P.L.A..
Some praise it as a well-balanced approach, firmly rooted in the principles of tort law. 00 Others, however, see the U.P.L.A. as an unwelcome
retreat to the days of negligence.' 0 ' Although a number of states have
incorporated various provisions of the U.P.L.A. in reforming their
products liability laws, presently no state has adopted it in full." 2
In Ohio, the reformation stage of strict products liability began to
manifest itself in the late 1970s. During the 1979-1980 session of the
Ohio General Assembly, the Ohio Senate passed a products liability
bill which made certain defenses available in all products liability actions, rejected the hindsight approach for evaluating design defects,
and proposed a statute of limitation that would be placed on many
types of products liability claims.' This bill subsequently failed in the
of the ideas embodied in it
Ohio House of Representatives, but0 many
4
1980s.1
mid
the
in
again
resurfaced
For more than eighteen months during 1986 and 1987, the Ohio
General Assembly debated the merits of different proposals for resolv-

94. See U.P.L.A., supra note 90, § I12(A)-(D), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,737-38.
95. Id.
96. Id. § 112(A), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,737.
97. Id. § 112(B), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,737.
98. Id. § 112(C), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,738.
99. Id. § 112(D), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,738.
100. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 50, at 639-43.
101. See, e.g., Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Strict Products
Liability, 10 IND. L. REV. 797, 825 (1980).
102. See SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSP., PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT, S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 69, 72 (1986).
103. S.B. No. 67, 113th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (1979-80). For a general discussion of the
various provisions of this bill, see Note, supra note 82, at 145-66.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/14
104. S.B No. 67, 113th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (1979-80).
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ing the insurance/tort crisis. Initially, eleven tort reform bills were introduced for consideration by the Ohio Senate in February of 1986.1°'
Senate Bill 330 became the primary focus in this effort and the remaining tort reform bills were grafted onto it in varying degrees. Later, in
April of 1986, a proposal calling for increased regulation of the insurance industry was introduced in the Ohio House of Representatives. 6
In September of 1986, the Senate tort reform bill and the House insurance reform bill were combined in Substitute Senate Bill 330. Some of
the most controversial provisions of Substitute Senate Bill 330 were
those which dealt with strict products liability. On November 21, 1986,
Substitute Senate Bill 330 was passed by both houses of the Ohio General Assembly. 0
Notwithstanding this vast legislative effort, Governor Richard F.
Celeste vetoed the measure on December 19, 1986.18 In his veto message the Governor severely criticized the products liability provisions of
the bill. He stated that "[b]y severely undermining the strict liability
doctrine and allowing the contributory negligence defense, these provisions would remove a vital health and safety protection offered for
Ohioans, both consumer and employee, while failing to provide cost
savings to Ohio businesses."' 1 9 The Governor urged the General Assembly to reintroduce the measure without the products liability section
and promised that if this were done he "would sign such a measure the
day it reached . . . [his] desk."110
In accordance with the Governor's message, in the early months of
1987 Ohio legislators removed many of the objectionable products liability provisions from Substitute Senate Bill 330 and reintroduced the
comprehensive tort reform package in the House of Representatives as
House Bill 1 (H.B. 1)."' The Ohio General Assembly passed H.B. 1 on
September 30, 1987 and the Governor signed the bill into law on October 5, 1987.112 The new law contained various compromises in its products liability provisions and the following analysis will evaluate the final
product of those compromises.
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ANALYSIS

With the enactment of H.B.1, Ohio has recently joined the movement for reform in the area of strict products liability. 113 As was the
case with the legislation of many other states and the U.P.L.A., the
primary goal of Ohio's reform act is to return a measure of balance to
the system of products liability."" The following analysis will consider
the extent to which that goal has been achieved by focusing on three of
the most controversial aspects of the Ohio act: (1) the adoption of the
bifurcated approach for determining whether a product is defective by
design; (2) the rejection of a hindsight standard for considering defectiveness; and (3) the disallowance of comparative negligence as a defense in a strict products liability action.
A.

The Test for Design Defect

The new law provides that a product is defective by design if either of the following tests apply: "(1) When it left the control of its
manufacturer, the foreseeable risks associated with the design . . . exceeded the benefits associated with that design . . . [or] . . .(2) It is
more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in
an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.""' 5 Essentially, this two
prong test for design defects is a codification of the standard set forth
by the Ohio Supreme Court in Knitz v. Minster Machine Co."' This is
unfortunate, because the Knitz decision established a standard which is
both confusing to jurors and unfair to defendants." 7 The major weakness of the Knitz approach-and hence the new law's provision on design defects-is the inclusion of the consumer expectation test as a
method for determining whether a product is defective by design.
Several valid criticisms have been leveled against the consumer expectation test. A number of authorities have acknowledged that the
consumer expectation test can be detrimental to a plaintiff's interests." ' For example, where a defect in a product is obvious-and thus
within the contemplation of the ordinary consumer-the plaintiff may
be barred from recovery under the consumer expectation test, despite

113. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71-2307.80 (Anderson Supp. 1988).
114. S. DARLING, OHIO CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT at v (1987).
115. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75.
116. 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982).
117. Cf Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods Co., 176 Mont. 123, 576 P.2d 725 (1978); Montgomery
& Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Liability for Defective Prod%
ucts, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803, 823 (1976).
118. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 421, 573 P.2d 443, 451, 143 Cal. Rptr.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/14
225, 233 (1978); Keeton, supra note 42, at 302.

19881

NOTES

the fact that the risks of the product heavily outweigh its utilities. " 9
Moreover, the consumer expectation test can be extremely detrimental
to the interests of the defendant/manufacturer. First, the expectation
standard may brand a product as "defective" where it clearly is not
defective. 120 The most often cited example is that of a drug which
would have tremendous utility for mankind but would also result in a
small number of adverse side effects which were unknowable to the
consumer or to the manufacturer. 2 Under these facts, the utilities of
the product would certainly outweigh its risks. Under the consumer expectation test, though, the drug would be defective in design because it
would be more dangerous than the ordinary consumer would expect.
Second, the subjective nature of the expectations test may
prejudice the defendant's interests. Justice Praeger, of the Kansas Supreme Court, observed that "the ends of justice require an objective
test, not a subjective test, in the area of products liability. A subjective
test in this field of the law is not really a test at all. It is an unbridled
license to the jury to 'do good' in the particular case. 122 Hence, when
the jury is left with no factors to weigh and only the subjective consideration of what an "ordinary" consumer would expect from a product,
the balance may be likely to fall in favor of the injured plaintiff, regardless of the utilities of the product in question.
Third, in many instances where technologically complex products
are being scrutinized, the consumer may have no expectations whatsoever regarding how safely the product could or should have been manufactured. 2 Yet, if the ordinary consumer does not know what to expect from a product, then how can a jury consisting of "ordinary
consumers" justly determine whether liability should be imposed upon
a manufacturer under the consumer expectation test?12 4 One commentator has suggested under these circumstances the jury will simply
"guess." 12 5 If this assumption is true, then the manufacturer will
at
least have a fair chance with the jury. Unfortunately, a more likely
result is that the jury will simply rely on the unconscious expectation or
belief that if a consumer exercises reasonable care in using a non-defective product, he will not be harmed by it. 12 6 Under this assumption,
when a technologically complex product causes the plaintiff's injury

119. See Keeton, supra note 42, at 302.
120. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 15, at 698.
121. Id.
122. Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc. 230 Kan 643, -, 641 P.2d 353, 363 (1982).
123. See Birnbaum, supra note 50, at 614.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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and the plaintiff has not misused the product, the jury will always conclude that the product is defective.
Still, courts adopting the bifurcated approach for determining design defects maintain that although the consumer expectation test cannot be used as an exclusive measure of defectiveness, it can serve as a
2 7 This two prong
useful floor below which no product design may fall.
approach resolves the plaintiff's problems regarding the consumer expectation test. In the situation discussed earlier involving a patent defect in the product, the injured plaintiff's claim will be saved by the
fact that now he can simply assert defectiveness under the risk/utility
prong of the test. However, the bifurcated approach does nothing to
alleviate the defendant's concerns with the consumer expectation test.
A plaintiff may still assert a claim under the expectations prong of the
test and expose the defendant to all of the subjective, prejudicial, and
unfair side effects which were discussed earlier.' 2 8
Ohio's new law could have returned a measure of balance to
Ohio's products liability system by adopting a simple risk/utility approach for determining whether a design defect exists. Such a standard
3 0 and legishas been supported by a number courts, 29 commentators,
11 The risk/utility test provides objective factors to be used as a
1
latures.
guide by the jury in arriving at their decision and it sends the correct
message to the manufacturing community:
If designs are examined in light of scientific, engineering, and other applicable principles in a products liability case, manufacturers who do not
adequately apply those principles will get the message and the deterrence
goal in this field of law will be achieved. If, on the other hand, the scientific principles that necessarily must be used to design products are ignored, so that the outcomes of lawsuits depends on a merely subjective
standard . . . [i.e. the consumer expectation test] . . . the only "message" that manufacturers will receive is that the legal system is irrational and capricious, a mere lottery.132
Unfortunately, the Ohio legislature has chosen a standard for determining defects which allows for such subjectivity and irrationality in its

127. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 421, 573 P.2d 443, 451, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 233, (1978).
128. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Jeng v. Winters, 452 F. Supp. 1349 (M.D. Pa.), afd, 591 F.2d 1335 (3d
Cir. 1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979); Morningstar v. Black
& Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
130. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 35, at 38; Wade, supra note 34, at 837-38.
131. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2801-34-2807 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3301
(1981).
132. Allen, Product Liability Law and Motor Vehicle Design, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 301, 311
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/14
(1983).
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liability law. And, to that extent, the standard for design deforth by the Ohio legislature fails to achieve a proper balance
the interests of consumers and manufacturers in the area of
liability law.

The Rejection of Hindsight

In Knitz, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted a "hindsight" standard
for ascertaining the time at which the defectiveness of a product will be
examined.1 33 Although the court's decision only expressly adopted this
standard for the risk/utility prong of the Knitz test, it should also be
noted that some aspects of hindsight are inherent in the consumer expectations prong of the test as well.134 One of the greatest strengths of
H.B.I is the fact that it eradicates almost every aspect of hindsight
liability from Ohio's products liability law.
There are basically three situations where hindsight liability
presents a problem: (1) when dangers or risks relating to the normal
use of the product are unknowable at the time of manufacture, but
knowable at the time of trial;' (2) when scientific or technological
breakthroughs since the time of the product's manufacture make it possible to design a safer product; 36 and (3) when a use or alteration of
the product is unforeseeable at the time of manufacture, but foreseeable at the time of trial. 3 7
In a recent publication, Professor Stanton Darling explains how
the language of the statute deals with each of the aforementioned
problems. 3 8 First, Professor Darling points out that under the risk/
utility prong of the new law, all three types of hindsight liability are
excluded."3 9 The use of the language "foreseeable risks' ' 14 0 relieves the
manufacturer of liability in instances where the danger in question in-

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Knitz, Ohio St. 2d at 462, N.E.2d at 814.
S. DARLING, supra note 114, at 63.
See Wade, supra note 41, at 754-56.
Id.
Id.
S. DARLING, supra note 114, at 70-72.

139. Id. at 71-72.
140. The statute defines "foreseeable risk" as follows:
(F) "Foreseeable risk" means a risk of harm that satisfies both of the following:
(1) It is associated with an intended or reasonably foreseeable use, modification, or
alteration of a product in question;
(2) It is a risk that the manufacturer in question should recognize while exercising
both of the following:
(a) The attention, perception, memory, knowledge, and intelligence that a reasonable manufacturer should possess;
(b) Any superior attention, perception, memory, knowledge, or intelligence that
the manufacturer in question possesses.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(F) (emphasis added).
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volved the normal use of the product and was unknowable at the time
of manufacture. The "foreseeable risks" language also shields the manufacturer from liability where an alteration or misuse of the product
was unforeseeable at the time of manufacture. 1" Moreover, the statute
excludes hindsight liability where:
[Alt the time the product left the control of its manufacturer, a practical
and technically feasible alternative design or formulation was not available that would have prevented the harm for which the claimant seeks to
recover compensatory damages without substantially impairing the usefulness or intended purpose of the product, unless the manufacturer acted unreasonably in introducing the product into trade or commerce. 42
Second, Professor Darling indicates that all but one type of hindsight liability is removed from the consumer expectations prong of the
statute's design defect standard. 14 3 The language of the test itself-"when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner
• . ."144 -certainly excludes the manufacturer from liability for uses or
alterations of the product which were unforeseeable at the time of manufacture. Likewise, the new law would protect the manufacturer from
being held liable for scientific or technological breakthroughs arising
subsequent to the products manufacture. 4 5 Nevertheless, one remnant
of hindsight liability will still exist in Ohio's products liability law.
Under the consumer expectations prong of the statute's design defect
test, a manufacturer may still be subject to hindsight liability for dangers or risks relating to the normal use of the product which were unforeseeable at the time of manufacture, but foreseeable at the time of
trial.146
Advocates of the hindsight approach may view Ohio's new products liability law as a return to a negligence standard in the area of
design defects; but in reality, this provision is simply an attempt to
justly balance the interests of both consumers and manufacturers in
Ohio's product liability system. A number of rationales have been offered for imposing hindsight liability upon manufacturers. Some authorities have maintained that hindsight liability is advantageous because it makes it easier for the plaintiff to recover and simplifies
evidentiary issues for the jury.1 47 Although "making it easier for the
plaintiff to recover" is an often expressed public policy behind strict

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

S.

DARLING,

supra note 114, at 71-72.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(F).
S. DARLING, supra note 114, at 71-72.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(F).
S. DARLING, supra note 114, at 71-72.
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See A. MURPHY, K. SANTAGATA & F. GRAD, supra note 26, at 27.
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products liability, trends in recent years would seem to suggest that it
has outlived its usefulness. " 8 In fact, the recent movement for reform
in the area of products liability has, in part, been premised on the belief that it has become too easy. for plaintiffs to recover from
manufacturers. 4 9
A more persuasive argument, though, is the one pertaining to evidentiary problems. Trying to set the evidentiary stage for a jury with
evidence of only what the defendant could have known at the time of
the product's manufacturing may be a formidable task. 150 In Beshada
v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,'5 ' the New Jersey Supreme Court
reasoned:
The vast confusion that is virtually certain to arise from any attempt to
deal in a trial setting with the concept of scientific knowability constitutes a strong reason for avoiding the concept altogether by striking the
state-of-the-art defense . ..Proof of what could have been known will
inevitably be complicated, costly, confusing and time consuming ....
We doubt juries will be capable of even understanding the concept of
scientific knowability, much less be able to resolve such a complex
1
issue. 5
However, it should be noted Professor Wade has persuasively countered
this argument.15 He maintains that this exact type of problem has
been addressed and resolved by juries in another familiar context-the
negligence case. 54 Under a negligence standard, the fault of an individual's actions is always judged at the time the action occurred, rather
than at the time of trial. Professor Wade concludes that since "courts
have not complained about experiencing undue difficulty in handling
this task . . .[p]erhaps . . .[the knowability requirement] . . .is not
as unwieldly as has sometimes been urged.' 55
Proponents of hindsight liability also argue that it is justifiable on
the grounds that it promotes the manufacture of safer products.' 6 Supposedly, the threat of hindsight liability will ensure that manufacturers
employ more careful and thorough testing procedures before placing a
product on the market. 57 This hypothesis is questionable in cases
where the hindsight issue involves scientific or technological break-

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Wade, supra note 41, at 754.
151. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
152. Id. at 202, 447 A.2d at 548.
153. See Wade, supra note 41, at 754-56.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Beshada, 90 N.J. at 202, 447 A.2d at 548.
157. byId.
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throughs in design safety. Where the technological means of detecting
a design defect are truly unknowable at the time of manufacture, no
amount of testing and no degree of thoroughness would reveal the defect. Moreover, this deterrence element may, in fact, serve as a disincentive for improvements in product safety.' 5 8 Once a product has been
marketed, a manufacturer might consider it prudent to reject safer alternative designs developed at a later time: By introducing a newer,
safer version of the product, the manufacturer may be branding his
previous product as defective. 5 9 Furthermore, in some cases, the deterrent threat provided by hindsight liability may result in over-deterrence.160 For example, the manufacturer of a new, extremely useful
drug might be encouraged to delay the introduction of the drug onto
the market despite the fact that its present utilities vastly outweigh its
present risks.'
Another argument made in support of hindsight liability is that
the manufacturer is in a better position than the plaintiff to spread the
loss resulting from the injury.' 62 Allegedly, manufacturing firms can
spread the costs of injuries caused by their products among a vast pool
of consumers vis-a-vis the price of their product.'6 3 However, there are
two problems with this argument. First, accurately adjusting prices to
reflect the costs of unknowable risks may be an impossible task. 6 Second, even if it was possible to spread such losses, it would be undesirable to do so. Although today's tort law does provide for strict products
liability, it does not provide for absolute products liability. 6 5 Yet, imposing hindsight liability upon a manufacturer comes very close to
achieving that very result. 66 If a manufacturer is to be held liable simply because it is more capable of spreading the loss, where will the
manufacturer's liability end? In all probability, it will not end until the
manufacturer has become an absolute insurer of its products. This result is clearly unacceptable under tort law principles.' 6 7
Ohio's new products liability statute abolishes most forms of hindsight liability and, in so doing, takes a significant step towards the goal
of returning balance to its products liability law. The new law takes a

158. See Wade, supra note 41, at 755.
159. Id.
160. See Payton v. Abbot Labs., 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982).
161. Id. at 569-70, 437 N.E.2d at 188.
162. Beshada, 90 N.J. at 205, 447 A.2d at 547.
163. Id.
164. See Wade, supra note 41, at 755.
165. See Birnbaum & Wrubel, N.J. High Court Blazes New Path in Holding a Manufacturer Liable, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 24, 1983, at 24, col. 1, 25-26.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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reasonable approach to evaluating design defects by providing that the
defectiveness of a product should be evaluated at the time of the product's manufacture and not at the time of trial. Such a rule is equitable
to the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants.
C.

The Refusal to Adopt Comparative Negligence

One of the most disappointing aspects of H.B.1 is its failure to
allow comparative responsibility to be asserted as an affirmative defense in strict products liability actions. Ohio's new statute provides
that "contributory negligence is not an affirmative defense to a products liability claim under sections 2307.71 to 2307.80 of the Revised
Code."1'68 This is basically a reaffirmation of the Ohio Supreme Court's
position in Bowling v. Heil Co.'6 9 As discussed earlier,1 70 the Bowling
court reasoned that the public policy goals underlying strict products
liability cannot be reconciled with those underlying comparative negligence. 17 1 Thus, the court held that there was no place for the application of comparative negligence principles in a strict products liability
1 72
action.
. However, there are a number of rationales for bringing the principles of strict liability and comparative negligence into accord.17 3 One
persuasive method for reconciling these two theories is to recognize
that the comparative responsibility of the plaintiff in comparative negligence actions can be viewed as the extent to which his conduct deviated
from that of the reasonable person.'7 4
Regardless of the approach chosen, though, comparative responsibility is consistent with the three major policy goals underlying strict
products liability. First, this doctrine does not make it any more difficult for the plaintiff to establish the defendant's liability. In Daly v.
General Motors Corp.,17 5 the California Supreme Court maintained
that "[p]laintiffs will continue to be relieved of proving that the manufacturer or distributor was negligent in the production, design, or dissemination of the article in question. Defendant's liability for injuries
caused by a defective product remains strict.' 17 Hence, under comparative responsibility, the defendant's liability will be determined in the

168. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20(C)(1).
169. 31 Ohio St. 3d 277, 511 N.E.2d 373 (1987).
170. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
171. Bowling, Ohio St. 3d at 280, 511 N.E.2d at 376.
172. Id.
173. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
174. See Note, Coney v. J.L.G. Industries: Applying Comparative Negligence to Strict
Products Liability: Should Ohio Follow?, 13 CAP. U.L. REV. 457, 475 (1984).
175. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
176. Id. at 729, 575 P.2d at 1166, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
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same way it always has been determined; but, the plaintiffs damages
will then be reduced by the extent to which his conduct deviated from
that of a reasonable person, or to the extent that he was at fault in
causing his own injury. Second, the doctrine of comparative negligence
is not inconsistent with the policy of spreading the loss. 177 It is desirable to spread the cost of an injury caused by a manufacturer's defective
product among all of the users of that product. However, it is not desirable that all product users should have to pay for that portion of an
injury which was attributable to the plaintiff's own carelessness or stupidity.1 78 Third, the principles of comparative negligence are not in
conflict with the theory of deterrence which underlies strict products
liability. 179 It has been argued that if comparative negligence is injected into strict products liability, manufacturers will become less concerned with improving product safety. 80 However, this argument overlooks the fact that manufacturers have no way of knowing whether any
consumers will use the product negligently. 8 ' Thus, manufacturers will
have to maintain the same standards regardless of whether the defense
of comparative responsibility is available. 8
Moreover, it can be argued that the adoption of a "pure" comparative negligence approach would be more equitable than Ohio's present
assumption of the risk defense to strict products liability. A "pure"
comparative approach would be more favorable to both consumers and
manufacturers. Assumption of the risk is an all-or-nothing defense.
Ohio's new statute provides that:
[I]f it is determined that the claimant expressly or impliedly assumed a
risk and that such express or implied assumption of the risk was a direct
and proximate cause of harm for which the claimant seeks to recover
damages, the express or implied assumption of the risk is a complete bar
8
to the recovery of those damages.' '
So, the plaintiff who is responsible for his own injury up to a certain
point will receive full compensation for the injury. But, the plaintiff
who is responsible beyond that point is completely barred from receiving any recovery. With the "pure" comparative responsibility approach,
there would be no such bar. Under a "pure" system, liability would be
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179.
180.
181.
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apportioned in direct proportion to fault in all cases.184 Thus, in Ohio, a
comparison of comparative negligence with assumption of the risk
reveals that comparative negligence constitutes a more just system of
recovery for injured plaintiffs.
In addition, the adoption of comparative responsibility as a defense
to strict products liability would be favorable for manufacturing interests. Under the present assumption of the risk defense in Ohio, the
manufacturer has a heavy burden to carry.'15 In order to establish the
assumption of risk defense, the defendant must show that: (1) the
plaintiff discovered the defect and was aware of its dangers; (2) the
plaintiff voluntarily used the product despite his knowledge of its defec8
tiveness; and (3) the plaintiff's use of the product was unreasonable.
It is the first element of this defense which is most difficult for the
defendant to prove. Because "awareness" deals with a subjective state
of mind, the facts pertaining to this issue may be solely within the possession of the plaintiff.'8 7 Furthermore, the jury will usually consider
evidence on the awareness issue in light of the "common-sense presumption that one generally does not do an act knowing that its direct
consequences will be death . . . [or] serious injury."' 88 But, under the
comparative approach, the manufacturer would be relieved of this unfair burden. The comparative responsibility defense bases its apportionment on an objective standard: It simply considers the extent to which
the plaintiff's conduct in using the product deviated from that of a reasonable person or the extent to which the plaintiff was at fault in causing his own injury. Hence, the comparative approach would constitute
a more equitable system of apportioning damages for the defendant as
well.
The failure of the Ohio General Assembly to adopt comparative
responsibility as a defense to strict products liability is unfortunate.
Not only is the doctrine of comparative responsibility consistent with
the policies of strict products liability, but it is also a more just system
of apportioning damages than the assumption of the risk defense now
in place.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, H.B.1's products liability provisions take a
step in the right direction, but they do not go far enough towards
achieving a balance between consumer interests and manufacturing in-
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See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351-52 (Tex. 1977).
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terests in Ohio's products liability system. The greatest strength of the
bill is its elimination of hindsight liability because this ensures that
"strict" products liability will not become "absolute" products liability
in Ohio. But, the two major weaknesses of the act are its adoption of
the consumer expectation test and its rejection of comparative responsibility as a defense to strict products liability. The consumer expectation
test is extremely subjective at best and prejudicial at worst. The legislature should have excluded the expectations test and simply adopted a
risk/utility standard for considering design defects. Finally, the legislature should have allowed comparative responsibility to be asserted as a
defense in strict products liability actions. Comparative responsibility
can be harmonized with strict products liability and it provides a more
equitable system of apportionment of damages than the present system
of assumption of risk.
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